Inspector Lillian arrived with a folding desk, a printer, and a written protocol.
“We are testing disclosure and charge consistency,” she told the vendor representatives. “Not intentions.”
The test included several transaction types so the inspection could not be accused of choosing only situations expected to fail.
A walk-in at a fixed-price stall.
A guide group at a disclosed-package stall.
A guide group at a scheme-aligned stall.
A temporary supply surcharge.
A large group with a pre-negotiated reservation.
Vendors signed the inspection-scope notice.
They knew an inspection was happening, but not which completed receipt would later be selected.
The first control was Jalia.
Public board: fish plate, 31,000.
Receipt: 31,000.
Pass.
The second was Saada Seafood.
Base menu: 33,000.
Optional package: reserved seating and juice, listed separately.
A sampled receipt matched the board.
Lillian asked the customer, “Did you understand that the package was optional?”
“Yes.”
Pass.
Then they sampled a scheme-aligned stall.
Public board: 33,000.
Guide-group receipt: 43,000.
No itemization.
The vendor said, “Group package.”
“What services?” Lillian asked.
“Priority preparation. Guide coordination.”
“Where were those services disclosed before ordering?”
The vendor pointed to an internal guide voucher.
“That is not a customer-facing menu.”
The customer said the guide had told the group only that it was “the group price.”
Lillian marked a disclosure failure, not fraud.
Kileo objected.
“Guide services have value.”
“Possibly,” Lillian answered. “The finding is not that the service is worthless. The finding is that the customer cannot reconstruct the additional charge.”
Another test involved a clearly displayed seafood surcharge caused by the recent supply problem. It passed.
A pre-booked group had a higher total but an advance message listing venue setup and drinks. It passed too.
Higher prices were not automatically wrong.
That distinction was now demonstrated, not merely asserted.
One sampled vendor challenged the inspectors. A juice charge they had initially classified as undisclosed had in fact been written on a small side board.
Lillian returned to the stall, saw the board, and corrected the finding.
The issue changed from *undisclosed* to *insufficiently prominent*.
Rehema was glad.
A compliance test that refused exculpatory evidence would only reproduce the unfairness they were trying to repair.
They also compared route rules.
The recovered penalty table, festival scoring, contracts, and route-map changes showed that vendors could lose visibility when they departed from guide-partnership expectations.
Kileo argued that route placement also depended on hygiene, capacity, and service quality.
Lillian agreed.
“Then publish those criteria and remove any hidden dependence on an opaque pricing band.”
That refined the reform concept.
Neutral access would not mean ignoring capacity or safety.
It would mean that visible, legitimate criteria—not secret pricing compliance—controlled route opportunity.
The provisional findings were specific:
1. Input-cost differences can justify different base prices if disclosed. 2. Optional packages can be legitimate if itemized and accepted. 3. Guide-linked uplifts were often not itemized under the existing scheme. 4. Route incentives reinforced participation in those price bands. 5. Consumer refunds lacked a clear standardized route. 6. Reform should combine disclosure, route neutrality, and remedy.
Some vendors feared losing margins.
Fatuma said, “If customers can reject the extras, they will.”
Lillian answered, “That is the commercial consequence of informed choice.”
There was no promise that reform would preserve every old revenue stream.
There was also no proposal to eliminate guide work.
Rehema recommended disclosed guide compensation and a transition period.
That evening, the association issued a public meeting notice.
Its title said:
**INDIVIDUAL GUIDE MISCONDUCT AND VISITOR PRICING**
Salim called Rehema.
“They are putting it on us.”
“The contract evidence shows a wider system.”
“Tomorrow I speak with my own name.”
“Think about the risk.”
“I have.”
Other guides had already created a small peer-support fund in case roster work disappeared.
Salim would not enter the square as a secret source.
At the end of the controlled test, each sampled vendor received a factual review sheet for their own transaction. They could point out a wrong board price, a missing sign, or a receipt feature the inspectors had overlooked. They could not edit the customer’s statement or see another vendor’s records. One correction changed a finding, proving the review was not ceremonial. Rehema considered that a success. If the process could not correct itself when a vendor produced better evidence, it had no right to demand that the market association do the same.
He would enter as a worker taking responsibility for his own conduct while refusing to carry the entire system on his back.